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Accordingly, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment finding that there were genuine issues of
material fact the trial court needed to determine. Thus, the court
remanded the case for further proceedings.

Matt Brodahl

NEW MEXICO
Lion's Gate Water v. D'Antonio, No. 31279, 2009 WL 5124536 (N.M.
Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that de novo review of a State Engineer's
decision that water is unavailable to appropriate limits a district court's
review to that sole, dispositive issue and that the statutory provision
requiring the State Engineer to order notice publication applies only
when water is available for appropriation).
In February 2003, Lion's Gate Water ("Lion's Gate") applied for a
permit with the Water Rights Division of the Office of the State
Engineer ("Water Rights Division") to appropriate new water from the
Gila River located in southwestern New Mexico. The Water Rights
Division summarily rejected Lion's Gate's application, concluding that
there was no water available for appropriation. Finding no water
available, the Water Rights Division did not answer the ancillary
questions of whether the proposed appropriation was contrary to the
conservation of water or whether the appropriation would be
detrimental to the public welfare. Lion's Gate subsequently filed seven
additional applications; the Water Rights Division rejected all of them.
Despite the rejected applications, Lion's Gate twice attempted, though
only once succeeded, to publish notice of its application for a permit.
According to New Mexico law, the State Engineer issues all permits.
Because of the statutory hearing prerequisite to an appeal, Lion's Gate
demanded an administrative hearing to review the State Engineer's
decision to reject Lion's Gate's amended applications. Before the
required hearing, however, Lion's Gate appealed its all of its initial and
subsequent rejected applications to the Sixth Judicial District Court (the
"district court").
The district court dismissed Lion's Gate's appeals for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because the hearing required by
statute was still pending. A year later, the State Engineer ordered a
hearing on the sole issue of whether water was available for
appropriation. Lion's Gate then filed an additional appeal in the
district court arguing that a limited hearing denied Lion's Gate the
constitutional right to fair and unbiased treatment. The district court
once again found no statutory basis for appeal before completion of the
required hearing. In August 2007, the hearing examiner granted the
Water Rights Division's motion for summary judgment because no
water was available to appropriate. Lion's Gate appealed the State
Engineer's summary judgment to the district court and requested
confirmation that the district court would hear the appeal as an original
case, including the issues the State Engineer did not consider. The
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district court granted a trial de novo on all issues, stating that it would
consider new evidence and evidence previously introduced at the
administrative hearing. Without ruling on whether the State Engineer's
grant of summary judgment was proper, the district court made several
findings, including: (1) the State Engineer failed its statutory obligation
to provide notice of Lion's Gate's application for permit; and (2) Lion's
Gate's self-initiated notice substantially complied with the requirements
prescribed by statute. After the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied
the State Engineer's appeal of the interim order, the State Engineer
petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court (the "court") for a writ of
certiorari, which the court granted.
Since 1907, the sole statutory means of acquiring a water right in
New Mexico has been by the State Engineer's issuance of a permit. A
statute establishing a de novo standard of review for appeals to the
district court from the State Engineer's rulings accompanied the 1907
water rights legislation. Judges have interpreted the 1907 statute as not
allowing a district court to hear new or additional evidence when it
reviews a State Engineer's decision. Agreeing with the judiciary, the
legislature added language to the statute, limiting a district court's de
novo review, "as cases originally docketed." Here, the court referred to
the statutory language and the legislative intent to determine the
meaning of the appeal statute's de novo provision.
The court reasoned that the intended effect of the water code's
grant of broad powers to the State Engineer regarding water rights
applications was to utilize the State Engineer's expertise and to provide
for a comprehensive administration procedure. Consequently, the
court determined that interpreting the appeals statute to permit the
district court to hear evidence on ancillary issues not decided by the
State Engineer would circumvent the intended effect of the water code.
Further, the court reasoned that because the availability of water for
appropriation is a threshold issue, the ancillary issues of whether the
proposed appropriation is contrary to the conservation of water or
whether the appropriation would be detrimental to the public welfare
are irrelevant when there is no water available. As a result, the court
concluded that the statute providing for a de novo standard of review
limits the district court's review to the sole decision made by the State
Engineer that water was unavailable. Additionally, the court noted that
public notice before a determination that water is available for
appropriation would unnecessarily involve the public and prior
appropriators. Therefore, the statutory provision requiring the State
Engineer to order notice publication applies only when water is
available for appropriation.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the district court's
ruling.
CrystalLay

